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 
Abstract— This paper proposes a stochastic variant of the 
stable matching model from Rasulkhani and Chow [1] which 
allows microtransit operators to evaluate their operation policy 
and resource allocations. The proposed model takes into account 
the stochastic nature of users’ travel utility perception, resulting 
in a probabilistic stable operation cost allocation outcome to 
design ticket price and ridership forecasting. We applied the 
model for the operation policy evaluation of a microtransit 
service in Luxembourg and its border area. The methodology for 
the model parameters estimation and calibration is developed. 
The results provide useful insights for the operator and the 
government to improve the ridership of the service. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Microtransit service has received increasing interests as an 
alternative to provide users (travelers) with flexible and 
convenient mobility services. This kind of service is 
characterized by its route flexibility to meet users' needs in 
terms of pickup and drop-off locations, and additional service 
such as wifi connections allowing passengers to work while 
traveling. Generally, a microtransit service operator deploys a 
fleet of vehicles to provide either door-to-door or a combined 
service to transit stations based on users' need. It has been 
tested in several cities in North America and Europe as a good 
solution for solving the first and last-mile transportation 
problems [2]-[3]. Integrating microtransit as a part of Mobility-
as-a-Service (MaaS) further enhances seamless multimodal 
transportation service to reduce personal car use. However, 
operating microtransit services usually requires higher 
operation cost compared to classical mass transportation which 
relies mainly on the subsidy from the government. Operators 
like Via and MaaS Global along with failed microtransit 
services like Kutsuplus [4], Bridj [5], and Chariot [6] show the 
importance of jointly taking into account the interactions of 
users’ preference and operators’ operating policy to evaluate 
the ridership and revenue on the service network.  
Most studies address the MOD/microtransit services 
planning from the supply-side perspective, focusing on vehicle 
routing and dispatching [7]–[12], pricing [13], vehicle 
rebalancing [14]. Existing methodology for modeling user-
transportation network interactions is usually based on 
dynamic traffic assignment models (DTA) or dynamic systems 
simulation via day-to-day adjustment [15-18]. These 
methodologies rely on modeling user’s travel choice behavior 
to achieve market equilibrium. However, in systems involving 
microtransit or mobility-on-demand service, it is difficult to 
draw insights on the impact of cost allocation mechanism on 
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ridership using traditional traffic assignment methods which 
requires using agent-based simulation model to derive traffic 
flow on the network.  
Different from the existing DTA approach, Rasulkhani and 
Chow [1] proposed a new user-route assignment approach 
based on the assignment games [19], [20]. This approach 
considers user-operator/-route assignment as a matching 
problem given users' travel preference and operators’ cost 
allocation mechanism. Under this modeling approach, users 
pay a ticket price for using the service and receive a net utility. 
Operators gain a net revenue by reducing its operating cost. 
The assignment game problem is designed such that users and 
operators have sufficient incentives (non-zero profit on each 
side) to participate. The recent development of the stable 
matching model further considers user-operator assignment on 
a multimodal transportation market with multiple operators 
[21]. However, there is still no realistic applications on 
microtransit service evaluation.    
In this study, we propose a stochastic variant of the stable 
matching model of Rasulkhani and Chow [1] for microtransit 
service evaluation. First, we present the proposed stochastic 
user-operator assignment model to match users and a set of 
service lines with capacity constraints. The model considers 
users’ stochastic travel utility perception resulting in a 
probabilistic stable operation cost allocation problem to set up 
ticket prices and forecast ridership. Second, we develop the 
methodology to estimate the model parameters and calibrate 
them based on the empirical microtransit service Kussbus 
(https://kussbus.lu/) data shared by the microtransit operator 
UFT (Utopian Future Technologies S.A.) in Luxembourg. 
Third, we apply the proposed approach to an empirical study 
of Kussbus in Luxembourg and its border areas. The impact of 
different pricing policies, route cost reduction and vehicle 
capacities on ridership and operator’s profit is evaluated which 
provided useful insights for the operator to improve their 
service planning. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
Notation 
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 a user or a set of homogeneous users 
𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 Index of routes, defined as a sequence of stops 
visited by a shuttle (bus)  
𝑈𝑠𝑟  Utility/payoff gained for user 𝑠 for matching 
route 𝑟. 
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𝐶𝑟 Operation cost of route r  
𝑡𝑠𝑟 Generalized travel cost for user s taking route r to 
connect origin to destination. It could be 
measured as the weighted sum of walking, 
waiting and in-vehicle riding time and ticket 
price. 
𝑎𝑠𝑟  Payoff gained resulting from (𝑠, 𝑟) match, 
defined as 𝑎𝑠𝑟 = max (0, 𝑈𝑠𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑟) 
𝑢𝑠 Payoff gained for user s  
𝑣𝑟  Profit gained for route r 
𝑢𝑠𝑟 Payoff gained for user s from matching route r  
𝑣𝑠𝑟  Profit gained for the operator from the user-route 
matching (𝑠, 𝑟) 
𝑐𝑠𝑟  Operation cost for user s to use route r  
𝑝𝑠𝑟  Ticket price for user s to use route r  
 
 
We consider a set of users to be assigned to a set of routes 
provided by a microtransit operator. A route is defined as a 
sequence of stops visited by a bus/shuttle. The user-route 
assignment problem is modeled as a many-to-one assignment 
game in which each route can be matched with multiple users 
and each user can be matched with at most one route. 
Moreover, vehicle capacity needs to be satisfied. An 
illustrative example is shown in Figure 1 in which we consider 
one user and two routes. A user’s generalized travel cost is 
considered as a door-to-door travel cost, measured as a 
weighted sum of walking time, waiting time, in-vehicle travel 
time, and ticket price paid to the operator. We call users as 
buyers and operators as sellers. The objective of the assignment 
game is to find a seller-buyer matching/assignment such that a 
total generalized payoff is maximized. The output of the stable 
matching model is the user-route flow and resulting ticket 
prices and the operating cost allocation of routes. The model 
allows testing the impact of different operation strategies and 
pricing on the ridership and operator’s revenue. The reader is 
referred to [1] for a more detailed description of the model 
properties. 
 
Figure 1.  Example of one user and two routes (r1 and r2).   
The stable matching model is formulated as follows. First, 
an optimal user-route assignment game problem (P1) is 
formulated to find user-route flows that maximize total 
generated payoff on the operator’s service network. 
 
P1: User-route assignment model  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆
 
 
(1) 
s.t.  
∑ 𝑥𝑠𝑟 ≤ 𝑞𝑠 , ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆\{𝑘}
𝑟∈𝑅
 
 
(2) 
∑ 𝛿𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟 ≤ 𝑢𝑟 , ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑟 , 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅
𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
 
 
(3) 
∑ 𝑥𝑠𝑟 ≤ 𝑀(1 − 𝑥𝑘𝑟), ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅
𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
 
(4) 
  
𝑥𝑠𝑟 ∈ {0, ℤ+}, , ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 (5) 
 
The objective function (1) is to maximize total payoff gains 
form the assignment. The payoff gained for user-route pair 
(𝑠, 𝑟) is 𝑎𝑠𝑟 = max (0, 𝑈𝑠𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑟), where 𝑈𝑠𝑟  is the utility gain 
of (𝑠, 𝑟), 𝑡𝑠𝑟 is the generalized travel cost of (𝑠, 𝑟). Equation 
(2) states the assignment of users on routes is constrained by 
its demand. Equation (3) states route capacity constraint 𝑢𝑟. 
𝛿𝑎𝑠𝑟 is an indicator being 1 if arc 𝑎 is used by user 𝑠 for route 
𝑟 and 0 otherwise. 𝑘 is a dummy user of not matching with any 
route with a utility of 0. Equation (4) ensures that a route is 
only matched when its total payoff exceeds a threshold cost. 𝑀 
is a big positive number. Equation (5) ensures that the decision 
variable 𝑥𝑠𝑟  is a non-negative integer. 
We extend the model of [1] by assuming the utility 𝑈𝑠𝑟  as an 
independent random variable composed of a deterministic part 
𝑉𝑠𝑟  and an unobserved part 𝜀𝑠𝑟 as 
𝑈𝑠𝑟 = 𝑉𝑠𝑟 + 𝜀𝑠𝑟 
  
(6) 
where  𝑉𝑠𝑟  is the mean utility gain and 𝜀𝑠𝑟 is a random utility 
term that follows a Normal distribution with mean 0 and 
standard deviation 𝜎.   
Given the assignment result of P1, a stable cost allocation 
problem (P2) is formulated under a desired objective in which 
operators and users have no incentive to switch. The output of 
P2 is the profile of net payoffs for users and routes of operators. 
 
P2: User-operator stable cost sharing model (stable 
sharing model)  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑍 
 
(7) 
s.t. 
 
 
∑ 𝑢𝑠 + 𝑣𝑟
𝑠∈𝐺(𝑟,𝑥)
≥ ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟 − 𝐶𝑟
𝑠∈𝐺(𝑟,𝑥)
, ∀𝐺(𝑟, 𝑥) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 
 
(8) 
∑ 𝑢𝑠 + 𝑣𝑟 = ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟 − 𝐶𝑟
𝑠∈𝑆(𝑟,𝑥)
, ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅∗
𝑠∈𝑆(𝑟,𝑥)
 
 
(9) 
𝑣𝑟 = 0, ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅\𝑅
∗ (10) 
  
𝑢𝑠 = 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆̅ = {𝑠| ∑ 𝑥𝑠𝑟 = 0
𝑟∈𝑅
} (11) 
𝑢𝑠 ≥ 0, 𝑣𝑟 ≥ 0, ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅
∗ (12) 
 
Equation (7) is a user-defined cost allocation mechanism to 
be maximized. A common setting is to use the buyer-optimal 
and seller-optimal objectives to obtain the vertices for the full 
range of stable outcomes. For the buyer-optimal case, the total 
utility gain of users is maximized, i.e. 𝑍 = ∑ 𝑢𝑠𝑠∈𝑆  to 
maximize; for the seller-optimal case, the total profit gain of 
operators is maximized, i.e. 𝑍 = ∑ 𝑣𝑟𝑟∈𝑅 . Equation (8) is the 
stable condition for which no user would have a better payoff 
other than the current assignment. 𝐺(𝑟, 𝑥) is the group of users 
that can be feasibly assigned on route 𝑟 given the solutions 𝑥 
of P1. Note that when operating costs can freely transfer 
between routes, Eq. (8) can be relaxed. We assume this 
constraint holds for the Kussbus case study. Equation (9-11) 
are the feasibility conditions where 𝑅∗ is the subset of routes 
with at least one matched user. 𝑆(𝑟, 𝑥) is the set of users 
matching route 𝑟, given an optimal assignment solution x 
obtained by P1. 𝑢𝑠 and 𝑣𝑟  are non-negative continuous decision 
variables. The solution of P2, denoted as {(𝒖, 𝒗); 𝑥}, is a cost 
allocation outcome given 𝑥.  
By introducing (6) in (8), (8) becomes: 
∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐺(𝑟,𝑥)
+ 𝑣𝑟 + 𝐶𝑟 − ∑ 𝑉𝑠𝑟
𝑠∈𝐺(𝑟,𝑥)
≥ ∑ 𝜀𝑠𝑟
𝑠∈𝐺(𝑟,𝑥)
,
∀𝐺(𝑟, 𝑥), 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 
(13) 
Given 𝜀𝑠𝑟 follows a Normal distribution, its summation is 
also a Normal distribution. We introduce the concept of 𝛼-
stability to measure the reliability for which the stability 
constraint is satisfied (e.g. 𝛼 = 0.05 implies being 95% sure of 
matching satisfying the constraint). Equation (13) can then be 
expressed deterministically as a chance constraint (14). 
𝛷 [
(∑ 𝑢𝑠𝑠∈𝐺(𝑟,𝑥) + 𝑣𝑟 + 𝐶𝑟 + ∑ 𝑉𝑠𝑟𝑠∈𝐺(𝑟,𝑥) )
|𝐺(𝑟, 𝑥)|
]
≥ 1 − 𝛼, ∀𝐺(𝑟, 𝑥), 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 
(14) 
where 𝛷(𝑧) = Pr (𝑍 ≤ 𝑧) is the cumulative density function of 
Z.  
By [22], the nonlinear constraint (14) can be transformed to 
a linear inequality as 
∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐺(𝑟,𝑥)
+ 𝑣𝑟 + 𝐶𝑟 − ∑ 𝑉𝑠𝑟
𝑠∈𝐺(𝑟,𝑥)
≥ 𝑍1−𝛼𝜎
′ 
(15) 
with new deviation 𝜎′ = √|𝐺(𝑟, 𝑥)|𝜎2. The extension is a 
generalization of the deterministic model from [1] with 𝛼 =
0.50. As the P2 problem is a linear programming problem, we 
can use the simplex algorithm or interior-point algorithm to 
obtain solutions efficiently. 
Given the 𝛼-stability outcome {(𝑢, 𝑣); 𝑥}𝛼, we can 
determinate ticket prices as: 
𝑝𝑠𝑟 = 𝑣𝑠𝑟 + 𝑐𝑠𝑟 , ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆\{𝑘} (16) 
with ∑ 𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑠∈𝑆(𝑟,𝑥) = 𝐶𝑟  and ∑ 𝑣𝑠𝑟𝑠∈𝑆(𝑟,𝑥) = 𝑣𝑟 , ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 
Given the cost allocation output obtained from P2, ticket 
prices can be determined using either the equal-share or cost-
based share policy. Note that in P1, the ticket price is left out 
from 𝑎𝑠𝑟  to determine optimal user-route flows. Ticket pricing 
is then determined from the outcome of P2. Operators can 
evaluate the ridership and profit as user-route matched flows 
by integrating ticket prices as a part of user’s generalized travel 
cost in P1. Consequently, the resulting ridership and operator 
profit depend on the integrated price schemes. 
III. DATA  
 Kussbus Smart shuttle service (https://kussbus.lu/en/how-
it-works.html) is a first microtransit service operating in 
Luxembourg and its border area. The service was provided by 
the Utopian Future Technologies S.A. (UFT) from April 2018 
to March 2019. Like most microtransit systems, users use 
dedicated Smartphone applications to book a ride in advance 
with desired origin, destination and pickup time as input. 
Service routes are flexible to meet maximum access distance 
constraint. Routes are generated in a way that users need to 
walk from/to the origin/destination to/from shuttle stops given 
a pre-defined threshold (i.e. around one kilometer). The service 
started operating between the Arlon region in Belgium and the 
Kirchberg district of Luxembourg City on 04/25/2018 and a 
second line started on 09/24/2018 between Thionville region 
(France) and Kirchberg district. Both service areas are highly 
congested on road networks due to high car use during morning 
and afternoon peak hours. 
The empirical ride data was provided by the operator for 
the period from 4/25/2018 to 10/10/2018. A total of 3258 trips 
(rides) were collected. Each ride contains the following 
information: booking date and time, pickup time and drop-off 
time, pickup and drop-off locations, pickup and drop-off stops, 
walking distance between stops and origins/destinations, 
origin-destination pairs of users, and fare. Any abnormal trips 
(e.g. trip duration less or equal to 5 minutes) were removed. As 
a result, a total of 3010 trips were used for this study.  
The characteristics of Kussbus service is summarized as 
follows. 
 Service areas: two service areas: a.) Arlon region 
(Belgium) ⟷ Kirchberg district (Luxembourg City), 
and b.) Thionville region (France) ⟷ Kirchberg 
district. 
 Operating hours: From 05:30 to 09:30 and from 16:00 
to 19:00 from Monday to Friday. 
 Vehicle capacity: vehicle capacity differs from 7-
seater, 16-seater, and 19-seater. 
 Booking and ticket price: users need to book a ride by 
the dedicated Smartphone application. First 6 trips are 
free, and then the unit ticket price is around 5 euros per 
trip. 
 Vehicle routing policy: vehicle routes are scheduled 
based on pre-booked customer requests on previous 
days. Late-requests could be accepted under certain 
operational constraints.  
  
More detail about the operation policy and characteristics 
of Kussbus service can be found at:  
https://uft.lu/en/news/references/kussbus.  
Figures 2 show the operating routes from Arlon to 
Luxembourg City. We can observe that most users are picked 
up at Arlon and transported to Luxembourg City in the 
morning. There are 429 possible routes observed from Arlon to 
Kirchberg and 449 in the reverse direction. From Thionville to 
Kirchberg there are 52 routes with 50 routes in the reverse 
direction. Figure 3 shows the cumulative probability 
distribution (CDF) of in-vehicle travel time. 60% of trips have 
a duration between 40 to 60 minutes. Figure 4 shows the 
weekly ridership during the study period. Note that the fall of 
ridership observed for the last two weeks was due the holidays 
of All Saints’ Day.   
 
Figure 2.  Kussbus operating routes from Arlon to Luxembourg City.  
 
Figure 3.   The cumulative probability distribution (CDF) of in-vehicle 
riding time. 
 
Figure 4.  Number of rides per week during 04/2018-10/2018. 
IV. STABLE MATCHING APPLICATION 
A. Case study setting 
We apply the proposed model for a realistic microtransit 
operation evaluation based on the ride data of Kussbus. The 
data contains 235 morning or afternoon commuting periods. 
The routes are generated beforehand. The characteristics of 
Kussbus service are shown in Table 1. The average length of 
routes is 46.5 km. Three types of shuttles, i.e. 7-, 16- and 19-
seater; were used. The route operation cost is estimated as 
proportional to its travel distance. The average operation cost 
per kilometer traveled is provided by the operator by taking 
into account the type of vehicles, fuel cost, driver cost and extra 
costs. Route travel time is estimated using Google Maps API 
during morning and afternoon peak-hour to consider congested 
traffic conditions.  
The value of in-vehicle travel time (VOT) is estimated by 
using a mobility survey conducted in October-November 2012 
for the EU officials and temporary employees working in the 
European institutions at the Kirchberg district of Luxembourg. 
The sample contains information on 370 valid individuals’ 
commuting practice and their socio-demographic attributes. 
These individuals live in France, Belgium and Germany border 
areas of Luxembourg that matches perfectly this study.  
Based on our previous study [23-26], we specify two 
econometric models, i.e. the mixed logit model and 
multinomial probit model for commuting mode choice 
behavior modeling. As the mixed logit model specification 
does not allow us to obtain the convergence result, we retain 
the result of the multinomial probit model for the VOT 
estimation. The estimated VOT is 24.67 euros/hour which is 
consistent with the existing study for the VOT estimation of 
Luxembourg [27]. 
TABLE I.  KUSSBUS SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS AND PARAMETERS 
SETTINGS. 
Attribute Value Attribute Value 
Number of trips 3010 Average travel distance of 
users 
43.0 
km 
Value of in-vehicle 
time (VOT) (euro)a 
24.21 
 
User’s maximum waiting 
time at stop 
10 
minutes  
Walking speed 
 
5km/hr Capacity of vehicles  7, 16 
and 19 
passeng
er seats 
Average route 
distance  
46.5 km Average route cost 61.0 
euros 
Remark: a. based on the estimation using a mobility survey for the EU officials and temporary 
employees working in the European institutions in Luxembourg. 
 
B. Calibrations of utility and 𝛼   
 
We calibrate the utility 𝑈𝑠𝑟  in (1) based on the Kussbus ride 
data. The data is divided into a first 80% training dataset and a 
test dataset with the rest 20%. 𝑈𝑠𝑟  is considered as  𝑈𝑠𝑟 = 𝑈𝑠
0 +
𝑡𝑠𝑟 + 𝜀𝑠𝑟, where 𝑡𝑠𝑟 is a door-to-door generalized travel cost, 
estimated as a weighted summation of user’s access time to 
shuttle stops, in-vehicle travel time and waiting time. The value 
of waiting time and walking time is set as 1.5 and 2 times of 
VOT [27]. 𝑈𝑠
0 is a constant utility term to be calibrated.  
  
We vary 𝑈𝑠
0 from 0 to 100 and solve the P1 problem. The 
calibration aims to find a 𝑈𝑠
0 which best matches the observed 
user-route flow in the data. Figure 5 shows 𝑈𝑠
0 ≥ 45 euros fits 
observed user-route matches with 79.03% corrected prediction 
rate on the training data. For the test dataset, it is 65.45%. We 
retain 𝑈𝑠
0 = 45 euros for this case study. Finally, the mean and 
standard deviation of 𝑈𝑠𝑟  is 73.39 and 3.57 respectively for 
Belgium-side rides. For the French-side rides, these numbers 
become 72.96 and 8.75, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.  The calibration of constant part 𝑈𝑠
0 of trip utility.  
C. Result 
 
We calibrate the reliability parameter 𝛼 to match observed 
user-route flow on the data. The buyer-optimal policy is used 
in P2 to maximize the ridership. The values of 𝛼 is varied from 
the set of (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5). As shown in Figure 6, 
we find 𝛼 = 0.2 has best fit with 63.45% corrected prediction 
rate for the training dataset and 54.43% for the test dataset, 
respectively. Table II gives the detail user-route assignment 
result based on Kussbus case study. We use 𝛼 = 0.2 and the 
test dataset to solve the P2 problem to obtain the ticket prices 
based on the buyer-optimal and operator-optimal pricing 
policies. Figure 7 shows the CDF of the ticket prices under 
different pricing schemes. We find Kussbus’s current tariff is 
quite low which gave 6 free rides to users and then charge 
around 5 euros per ride. For the buyer-optimal policy, the 50- 
percentile of the ticket prices is 10.98 euros. For the operator-
optimal policy, it becomes 49.91 euros, which is still much 
cheaper compared to the current taxi fare in Luxembourg.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Corrected prediction rates of observed user-route matches for the 
training dataset over different 𝛼. 
 
Finally, Table III shows the operator’s ridership, revenue, 
operation cost and profit under these pricing schemes. We find 
that Kussbus’ operated policy would accumulate a financial 
loss of  -4135 euros for 465 matched users. When setting the 
ticket prices on the buyer-optimal policy, there is 426 users 
should match with the routes with a positive profit of 187 
euros. However, when setting the ticket prices on the operator-
optimal policy, there are only 6 users who match with the 
routes due to high ticket prices. For taxi fare, there are no 
matches due to its very high tariff with respect to users’ trip 
distance. 
TABLE II.  USER-ROUTE ASSIGNMENT RESULT OF KUSSBUS RIDES FOR 
235 PERIODS. 
Data  Number 
of ride 
requests 
(users) 
Number 
of user-
route 
assignm
ent  
User-
route 
assignm
ent rate 
Number of 
rides 
matched 
with 
observations   
Matched 
rate 
(observation 
v.s. 
prediction) 
Training 
dataset  
2395 1829 0.7638 1520 0.6345 
Test 
dataset  
615 431 
 
0.7011 
 
335 0.5443 
Remark: The reported result is the average of 5 runs. The average computational time for the 
training data set is 84.7 seconds and 29.0 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 7.  The cumulative probability distribution of user’s ticket prices 
under different pricing policy for the test dataset. 
TABLE III.  REVENUE, OPERATING COST AND PROFIT OF DIFFERENT 
PRICING POLICIES FOR THE TEST DATASET. 
Policy Ridership Revenue 
Operatin
g cost Net profit 
Kussbus’s tariff 
465 
(75.5%) 1266 5401 -4135 
Buyer-optimal ticket 
price 
426  
(69.2%) 4831 4644 187 
Seller-optimal ticket 
price 
6 
(0.98%) 231 103 128 
Taxi 0 0 0 0 
Remark: Measured in euros. The reported result is the average of 5 runs. 
 
D. Sensitivity analysis 
 
We conduct a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the impact of 
route cost reduction and vehicle capacity changes scenarios. 
Two pricing policies based on the buyer-optimal and seller-
optimal setting are evaluated using the test dataset and α=0.2. 
Table IV shows the ticket prices for different scenarios. For 
  
the route cost reduction scenario, under the buyer-optimal 
policy, we find when reducing from -10% to -50% of the route 
cost, the ticket price would reduce from -6.9% to -37.9%. 
However, under the seller-optimal policy, the ticket price 
would keep stable with less than 1% variation. For the vehicle 
capacity scenario, we find using a fleet of 7-seater shuttles 
would reduce the ticket prices up to -9.5% based on the buyer-
optimal policy. When increasing the vehicle capacity to 16 and 
19 seats, the resulting ticket prices would increase 
considerably to +56% and +75.1% due to a higher cost for 
operating these types of vehicles. For the seller-optimal 
policy, we find a lower ticket price of around -9.4% compared 
to the current mixed fleet. 
 
TABLE IV.  TICKET PRICE VARIATION BASED ON DIFFERENT SCENARIOS. 
Route cost 
Reduction BO SO 
 Euro ±% Euro ±% 
0% 11.6  49.1  
-10% 10.8 -6.9 49.4 0.6 
-20% 10 -13.8 49.4 0.6 
-30% 9 -22.4 49.3 0.4 
-40% 8.2 -29.3 49.1 0.0 
-50% 7.2 -37.9 48.9 -0.4 
Veh. capacity 
changes BO SO 
 Euro ±% Euro ±% 
Mixed fleet 11.6  49.1  
7-seater 10.5 -9.5 44.5 -9.4 
16-seater 18.1 56.0 44.6 -9.2 
19-seater 20.2 74.1 44.4 -9.6 
Remark: BO: Buyer-optimal pricing; SO: Seller-optimal pricing. The result is based on the 
average of 5 runs. 
 
 
Table V shows the impact of these two scenarios on the 
operator's ridership and profit based on the buyer-optimal 
policy. We find that a route cost reduction of 50% would 
increase the ridership up to +10%. However, it is not 
beneficial for the operator.  Figure 8 shows the impact of the 
route reduction scenario on the ridership and profit under 
buyer-optimal and seller-optimal policies.  
For the vehicle capacity scenario under the buyer-optimal 
policy, using a fleet of 7-seater vehicles would increase the 
ridership of 3.5%. While for the 16- and 19-seater scenarios, 
it would reduce the ridership up to -5.6% and -16.2%, 
respectively, due to the higher ticket prices (see Table IV). The 
impact on the operator's profit is negative with -103.5% and 
106.4%, respectively.  
We conclude that if the government were to intervene, we 
recommend they subsidize Kussbus to improve their route 
operating costs. Moreover, we find the current mixed fleet 
strategies are more beneficial compared to using a fleet of 
vehicles of the same capacity. Our sensitivity analysis shows 
how the proposed stable matching model can be applied to 
evaluate different service designs. The operator can apply this 
methodology to set up ticket prices by considering the price 
ranges from buyer-optimal and seller-optimal policies.   
 
TABLE V.  INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT SCENARIOS ON THE RIDERSHIP 
AND PROFIT. 
Route cost 
Reduction Ridership Profit 
 # ±% Euro ±% 
0%   431  202  
-10% 428 -0.7 199 -1.5 
-20% 436 1.2 129 -36.1 
-30% 460 6.7 113 -44.1 
-40% 467 8.4 148 -26.7 
-50% 474 10.0 12 -94.1 
Veh. capacity 
changes Ridership Profit 
 # ±% Euro ±% 
Mixed fleet  431  202  
7-seater 446 3.5 0 -100.0 
16-seater 407 -5.6 -7 -103.5 
19-seater 361 -16.2 -13 -106.4 
 Remark: based on the buyer-optimal policy. The result is based on the average of 5 runs. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Influence of different route cost reduction scenarios on the 
ridership and the profit of the operator.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This study proposes a stochastic user-operator assignment 
game model for the microtransit operation policy evaluation. 
The proposed methodology generalizes the previous work of 
[1] by considering the utility function 𝑈𝑠𝑟  as a stochastic 
variable, which converts the deterministic stable matching 
model to a stochastic one. By introducing the concept of 𝛼-
reliability and formulate the cost allocation problem with 
chance constraints, the proposed model allows us to better 
  
capture the heterogeneity of travel preference for its realistic 
application for microtransit operation policy evaluation. We 
conduct the first empirical applications of the model based on 
the historical ride data from Kussbus microtransit service in 
Luxembourg and its border areas. The data is shared by the 
industry collaborator Utopian Future Technologies S.A. 
covering 3010 trips made between April to October 2018.  
We calibrated the model by 80% of the data and validated 
the model by the rest of 20% of the data. We found Kussbus 
current ticket prices are not sustainable. By increasing the 
ticket price to the buyer-optimal policy, it would reduce 
ridership from the current 465 trips to 426 trips and changing 
the net profit from -4135 euros to 187 euros for 615 ride 
requests. We conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to the 
operation cost reduction and vehicle capacity changes 
scenarios. The result shows reducing the operation cost of 
50% would increase the ridership of 10% while resulting in 
further financial loss. We find that the government can 
intervene by offering to subsidize Kussbus to improve their 
routing algorithms and reduce operating costs while requiring 
operation under a buyer-optimal policy. For the vehicle 
capacity scenario, we find under the buyer-optimal policy, the 
current mixed fleet strategy would be more beneficial for the 
operator compared to using a homogeneous fleet of vehicles.  
This study shows the potential of the proposed model for 
on-demand mobility service evaluation. Future extensions 
could consider the evaluation of shared mobility platforms 
(see Chapter 3.5 in [28]) and microtransit service in a 
Mobility-as-a-Service market [21]. Furthermore, considering 
dynamic cost allocations (e.g. [29]) could be another avenue 
for future research. 
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